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LOST OPPORTUNITY COST TO UNDERSECURED
CREDITORS: THE SHIFTING SANDS OF THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT POSITION
[Lend Lease v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In Re Briggs Transp. Co.), 780 F.2d
1339 (8th Cir. 1985)]
INTRODUCTION
Chapter I of the Bankruptcy Code, with its rehabilitation provi-
sions,' provides debtors with an alternative to outright liquidation.2
Two competing policies at work in this context must be accommo-
dated. First, public policy favors reviving a business as an alternative
to outright liquidation.3 Second, while the debtor's interests are ac-
corded great weight, the creditor's competing interests must also be
accomodated.4
Debtors are entitled to reorganize their debts and start afresh if
they can formulate a plan which is feasible and has a reasonable
chance for success. 5 To facilitate formulation of a plan, debtors are
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 completely revamped the bankruptcy laws of the United States. See Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEWS 5787,
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-15132 (1982)); Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in
scattered sections of Titles 11 and 28 of U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985)).
One commentator has noted that one of the initial goals of a debtor in Chapter
11 "is usually to obtain a respite from creditors and their collection efforts." Ander-
son, Adequate Protection of Opportunity Cost After In re Briggs, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 765,
765 (1986). Another commentator stated that "chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is
a rejection of economic Darwinism." Comment, Adequate Protection and the Automatic
Stay Under the Bankruptcy Code: Easing Restaints on Debtor Reorganization, 31 U. PA. L.
REV. 423, 423 (1982).
2. See Comment, supra note 1, at 423; see also In re Chugiak Boat Works, Inc., 18
Bankr. 292, 298 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982) (Congressional policy is to create alterna-
tives to liquidation).
3. See Chugiak Boat Works, 18 Bankr. at 298 ("It is the purpose of Chapter 11 to
prevent those liquidations that are avoidable"); see also D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR
LjAw, at 134-35 (1980).
4. See Comment, Chapter 11 Reorganization: Modification & Confirmation of the Plan,
3 BANKR. DEV. J. 407, 407 (1986) (Chapter I 1 must accommodate the conflicting
interests of the debtor and creditor); accord Comment, supra note 1, at 423.
5. I1 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see Massari, Adequate Protec-
tion Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 1979 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 171, 171 (this policy
has taken a pro-secured creditor shift by the enactment of section 361). But see
United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (I re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1382 (5th Cir.), reh'gganted, 802 F.2d 777
(5th Cir. 1986), aff'd en banc, 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) ("we are not persuaded
1
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granted an automatic stay upon filing a Chapter 11 petition6 which
gives them a "breathing spell" in which to formulate a plan of
reorganization.7
Conversely, secured creditors in Chapter 11 proceedings are enti-
tled to receive "adequate protection" of their interests in the secured
property.S The statute provides that the creditor's interest in prop-
that Congress intended in 1978 to make fundamental changes in the adequate pro-
tection rules as they developed").
6. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides that, with certain excep-
tions, the filing of a petition operates as a stay to:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of
a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Pistole v. Mellor (In re Mellor), 734
F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (discusses the concept of the automatic stay being
designed to afford the debtor a breathing spell in which to formulate a plan).
7. The stay is automatic upon the moment of filing the Chapter 11 petition. 11
U.S.C. § 362(e) (1982). Generally, the purposes behind the stay are to give the
debtor time to work with the creditors to propose a plan of reorganization, and to
prevent creditors from obtaining preferential treatment over each other by quick ac-
tion. See Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1387.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. III 1986).
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364
of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection
may be provided by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash pay-
ments to such entity, to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this
title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of this title, or any grant of a lien
under section 364 of this title results in a decrease in the value of such en-
tity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the
extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the
value of such entity's interest in such property; or
[Vol. 13
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erty must be adequately protected and the protection must be the
"indubitable equivalent" of the interest.9 The terms "indubitable
equivalent" and "adequate protection" are not statutorily defined.to
It has been left for the courts to decide just what adequate protection
means and how it can best be provided.t" However, what interests
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to com-
pensation allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative
expense, as will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable
equivalent of such entity's interest in such property.
Id. (emphasis added).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3).
10. See, e.g., Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Neb. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyu-
can Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803, 805 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) ("Adequate protec-
tion is not defined in the Code").
The term "indubitable equivalent" comes from an oft-quoted statement by
Judge Learned Hand in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re
Murel Holding Corp.), 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
In construing so vague a grant, we are to remember not only the underlying
purposes of the section, but the constitutional limitations to which it must
conform. It is plain that "adequate protection" must be completely com-
pensatory; and that payment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent
of payment now. Interest is indeed the common measure of the difference,
but a creditor who fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be content
with that; he wishes to get his money or at least the property. We see no
reason to suppose that the statute was intended to deprive him of that in the
interest of junior holders, unless by a substitute of the most indubitable
equivalence.
Id. at 942 (emphasis added). See S. REP. No. 95-989 at 127, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5913 ("The indubitable
equivalent language is intended to follow the strict approach taken by Judge Learned
Hand in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935)"). But see Lend Lease v.
Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp. Co.), 780 F.2d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir. 1985).
" 'Indubitable equivalence,' the language on which the creditors here rely for com-
pensation of their claimed lost opportunity costs, was designed to broaden, not cir-
cumscribe, the range of solutions available to debtors and creditors in determining
what interests in a particular case are to be adequately protected." Id. at 1346.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6295. In referring to section 361, Congress de-
scribed the role of adequate protection.
The section, and the concept of adequate protection, is based as much on
policy grounds as on constitutional grounds. Secured creditors should not
be deprived of the benefit of their bargain. There may be situations in bank-
ruptcy where giving a secured creditor an absolute right to his bargain may
be impossible or seriously detrimental to the bankruptcy laws. Thus, this
section recognizes the availability of alternate means of protecting a secured
creditor's interest. Though the creditor might not receive his bargain in
kind, the purpose of the section is to insure that the secured creditor re-
ceives in value essentially what he bargained for.
The section does not specify how value is to be determined, nor does it specify when
it is to be determined. These matters are left to case-by-case interpretation
and development. It is expected that the courts will apply the concept in
light of facts of each case and general equitable principles. It is not in-
tended that the courts will develop a hard and fast rule that will apply in
every case. The time and method of valuation is not specified precisely, in
19871
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are to be given adequate protection is an entirely different
question. 12
In recent years, a debate among the courts has arisen as to what a
secured creditor, whose collateral is worth less than the amount of
the debt,13 is entitled to under the doctrine of adequate protection. 14
The question analyzed in this Comment is whether an undersecured
creditor's opportunity cost is an interest in property which is entitled
to adequate protection.15
A split has developed in the cases. Some cases have held that the
undersecured creditor is entitled to protection only to the extent of
the "recoverable value" of the collateral.16 This would only allow
order to avoid that result. There are an infinite number of variations possi-
ble in dealings between debtors and creditors, the law is continually devel-
oping, and new ideas are continually being implemented in this field. The
flexibility is important to permit the courts to adapt to varying circum-
stances and changing modes of financing.
Id. (emphasis added).
Whether a creditor's interest has been adequately protected is generally seen as
a question of fact, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Martin v. United
States (In re Martin), 761 F.2d 472, 474 (8th Cir. 1985).
12. See Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mari-
ner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 434 (9th Cir. 1984).
13. A debt whose value is less than the amount of the lien is called an under-
secured debt. Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1380; see American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 434.
The early cases, decided before enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, are of little relevance in construing sections 361 and 362.
Among the recent cases construing these sections there is a split of author-
ity. Several courts have relied in part on Judge Hand's opinion in Murel to
require adequate protection under section 361 of the present value of the
secured creditor's interest.
An apparently growing number of bankruptcy courts approve the view
... extending adequate protection to the value of the collateral alone.
Id. (footnote omitted). Compare General Elec. Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc.
(In re South Village, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) andAlyucan, 12 Bankr.
at 806-12, with American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 433-35. But see Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1387
(relies heavily on prior law).
14. Compare Comment, supra note 1, at 454,(adequate protection does not require
that creditor's compensation be complete)with Comment, Compensation for Time Value
as Part of Adequate Protection During the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
305, 324-25 (1983) (Code history supports time value compensation).
The legislative history and underlying policies of the Code, however, sup-
port granting time value compensation. Although granting time value com-
pensation may reduce the funds available to effect successful
reorganizations, examination of the Code reveals that reorganizations are
not to be implemented at the expense of forcing secured creditors to accept
less than they would receive in liquidation.
Id.
15. See Comment, Acceleration of Plan Confirmation Analysis to the Pre-Confirmation
Stage Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 831 (1986).
16. Those courts that have rejected the protection of opportunity costs and lim-
ited adequate protection to protection against depreciation of the asset include, Tim-
bers, 793 F.2d at 1416; In re Penny, 52 Bankr. 816, 821 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985);
[Vol. 13
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creditors protection to the extent the collateral was depreciating.17
Other courts have held that the undersecured creditor is entitled to
payment for the lost reinvestment opportunity of the collateral in
addition to the protection against depreciation.8 These courts con-
clude that the creditor's interests in property includes opportunity
costs and, as such, they must be protected.19
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue recently
United States v. Smithfield Estates, Inc. (In re Smithfield Estates, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 910,
914 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985); In re Keller, 45 Bankr. 469, 472-73 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1984); In re Rowe, 43 Bankr. 157, 159 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984); In re Aegean Fare,
Inc., 34 Bankr. 965, 968-70 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of
Lima v. Shriver (In re Shriver), 33 Bankr. 176, 181-83 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983); Fort
Worth Mortgage Corp. v. Cantrup (In re Cantrup), 32 Bankr. 1004, 1005 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1983); Barclays Bank of N.Y. v. Saypol (In re Saypol), 31 Bankr. 796, 800-02
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); South Village, 25 Bankr. at 989; In re Pine Lake Village Apart-
ment Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 826 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Provident Bank v. BBT (In re
BBT), 11 Bankr. 224, 229 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981); Hoyt, Inc. v. Born (In re Born), 10
Bankr. 43, 47-48 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Nixon Mach. Co.
(In re Nixon Mach. Co.), 9 Bankr. 316, 317-18 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981). See also
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner, Indus.,
Inc.), 27 Bankr. 1004, 1010 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.
1984); Alyucan, 12 Bankr. at 808 n. 11. The rule of these cases was adopted by the
editors of the leading multi-volume treatise on bankruptcy. See 2 L. KING, COLLIER
ON BANKRUVrCY, § 361.01 (15th ed. 1985) [hereinafter COLLIER].
17. See, e.g., Penny, 52 Bankr. at 821.
18. Those courts that have adopted a rule requiring protection of opportunity
costs by the undersecured creditor include: Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining
Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 434; In re Western
Preferred Corp., 58 Bankr. 201, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); Northern Trust Co. v.
Leavell (In re Leavell), 56 Bankr. 11, 13 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1985); Doty v. Pulliam (In re
Pulliam), 54 Bankr. 624, 625-26 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Olney Town Center Dev. Corp. v.
Woodland Hills Village Dev. Corp. (In re Woodland Hills Village Dev. Corp.), 54
Bankr. 77, 78 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985); In re Wolsky, 53 Bankr. 751, 756 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1985); In re Deeter, 53 Bankr. 623, 626-27 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985); In re Indepen-
dence Village, Inc., 52 Bankr. 715, 727 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); Levin v. Kedzie-
Carrol Currency Exch., Inc. (In re Cash Currency Exch., Inc.), 52 Bankr. 577, 580
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); In re Vanas, 50 Bankr. 988, 998-99 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985);
Republic Bank Houston, N.A. v. Bear Creek Ministorage, Inc. (In re Bear Creek
Ministorage, Inc.), 49 Bankr. 454, 457 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); In re Lilyerd, 49
Bankr. 109, 117 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); Citizens State Bank v. Alexander (In re Alex-
ander), 48 Bankr. 110, 119 n.18 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985); In re Cassavaugh, 44 Bankr.
726, 729 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); In re Mary Harpley Builder, Inc., 44 Bankr. 151,
155-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Nordyke (In re
Nordyke), 43 Bankr. 856, 861 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Monroe Park (In re Monroe Park), 17 Bankr. 934, 939-40 (Bankr. D. Del. 1982);
United Virginia Bank v. Virginia Foundry Co. (In re Virginia Foundry Co.), 9 Bankr.
493, 495 (W.D. Va. 1981); see also Albion Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Langley (In re Lang-
ley), 30 Bankr. 595, 604-05 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (using case-by-case approach,
court orders protection); Medlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re
Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635, 643 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (court lifts
stay where under secured creditor's interest could not be adequately protected).
19. See, e.g., American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 434.
1987]
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in In re Briggs Transportation Co. 2 0 In an attempt to balance the equi-
ties, the court rejected both positions advanced by other courts.2 '
Rather, the court held that whether an undersecured creditor is enti-
tled to "lost opportunity costs" must be decided by the bankruptcy
court on a case-by-case basis.22 It rejected the proposition that a
creditor must be protected as a matter of law, and similarly rejected
the position that such a creditor interest should never be protected
in this context.2 3 While the court strove to adopt an equitable rule,
the position leaves the bankruptcy courts with no guidance on how
to handle these cases. 24 Nor does the case give counsel any guidance
on how to advise clients to proceed under similar circumstances. 25
Under the Eighth Circuit's rule, it is anyone's guess as to whether a
creditor's interest in the time value of its investment is to be
protected.
While the approach that requires protection of the creditor's inter-
est in this context might make marginal reorganizations more diffi-
cult to achieve,26 it more accurately reads the language of the statute
and the purposes gleaned from its history and economic realities.27
20. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d at 1339 (8th Cir. 1985); see also United
States v. Peach State Distrib. Co. (In re Peach State Distrib. Co.), 58 Bankr. 873, 875
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (follows Briggs rule); In re Sheehan, 58 Bankr. 296, 303-04
(Bankr. S.D. 1986) (applies Briggs rule in holding no protection required). Cf Rowe,
43 Bankr. at 160 (court acknowledges that, in some instances, basic principles of
equity might require compensation to creditors in these cases).
21. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1351 (Gibson, J. dissenting). Judge Gibson points out in
his dissent that the court's opinion is an attempt "to chart a course between those
courts which have held as a matter of law that compensation may not be allowed....
and those courts which hold that as a matter of law it must be considered .... " Id.
22. Id. at 1350. The court cites the proposition that "adequate protection deter-
minations . . . are questions offact subject to the clearly erroneous standard" in support
of this position. Id. (emphasis added). This seems inconsistent with earlier language
in the case that states that "the issue now before us is a question of law as to what
creditor interests are incorporated in the scope of adequate protection and is thus
subject to de novo review." Id. at 1342 (emphasis added).
23. See id. at 1349.
24. See id. at 1351 (GibsonJ. dissenting) ("The weakness of the court's position
is that it sets free the bankruptcy court without any guidance whatsoever .... ").
The majority opinion even acknowledged the difficulty in this regard. "We rec-
ognize that a rule which directs courts to appoach adequate protection analyses on a
case-by-case basis provides minimal guidance for future reconstruction by courts of a
secured creditor's bargain for adequate protection purposes. Id. at 1349.
The majority, however, determined that this flexible approach provides the most
equitable alternative. See id. at 1348 (court stresses the need to avoid a rigid rule).
25. One of the major problems with this flexible position is the potential deliteri-
ous effect it could have on the cost of secured credit. See infra note 50 and accompa-
nying text.
26. See Penny, 52 Bankr. at 821.
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Similarly, this approach will protect debtors who can produce feasi-
ble reorganizations, while also protecting creditors by ensuring that
all of their rights will be protected.28
The fault with the Eighth Circuit's position is that it leaves under-
secured creditors with little guidance on whether this is an interest
that will be protected.29 The Eighth Circuit should have adopted the
dissent's approach because it more properly applies the relevant
doctrines and policies involved and reflects the current trend of the
law.SO
I. OPPORTUNITY COST NOT AN ELEMENT
OF ADEQUATE PROTECTION
Some courts that have addressed this issue have determined that,
as a matter of law, the undersecured creditor's opportunity cost is
not entitled to adequate protection.31 At least one of the courts that
rejected this principle expressed concern that providing this protec-
tion would unduly hamper the ability of debtors to successfully ac-
complish Chapter 11 reorganizations.32 Additionally, statutory33
and policy grounds have been relied on to reject this protection.34
One of the leading proponents rejecting recovery of opportunity
cost is Judge Mabey, formerly a Bankruptcy Court Judge of the Dis-
trict of Utah.35 In a pair of cases,3 6 Judge Mabey analyzed the issue
of adequate protection and determined that undersecured creditors
28. See Gordianer, The Indubitable Equivalent of Reclamation: Adequate Protection for
Secured Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 299, 300 (1980) ("the
Federal Government must assure secured creditors that their rights in collateral will
not be impaired."). But see Comment, supra note 15, at 832 ("Narrow interpretations
of adequate protection will crowd out potential reorganizations in an already desper-
ate agricultural economy.").
29. See Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1351 (Gibson, J. dissenting).
30. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 770; infra notes 141-201 and accompanying
text. But see Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1411-12.
31. See supra note 16. See generally 2 COLLIER, supra note 16, § 361.01.
32. See, e.g., Keller, 45 Bankr. at 473. The Iowa Bankruptcy Court stated that to
allow payment of opportunity costs to under secured creditors would "in essence
eviscerate the Bankruptcy Code and make Chapter 11 reorganization virtually impos-
sible to accomplish." Id.
33. See, e.g., South Village, 25 Bankr. at 990-99 (court cites legislative history and
other Code provisons in support of position); see also infra notes 52-68 and accompa-
nying text.
34. See American Mariner, 27 Bankr. at 1010 ("A construction more consistent with
the language and policy to be served would recognize that it is the value of the collat-
eral which is the focus of protection."); see also infra note 70 and accompanying text.
35. Judge Mabey resigned his post in 1983. Telephone interview with Clerk of
Utah Bankruptcy Court (Feb. 6, 1986).
36. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 1002 (holds that under secured creditors are not
entitled to opportunity cost as a part of adequate protection); ,4lyucan, 12 Bankr. at
810 (rejects creditor's equity cushion argument).
1987]
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are not entitled to the recovery of opportunity cost as an aspect of
adequate protection.37
In In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., Judge Mabey emphasized that ade-
quate protection must be a flexible concept which cannot be limited
by a brittle construction.38 Applying this concept in In re South Village
Inc., Judge Mabey analyzed the statute and its legislative history and
determined that the interest of an undersecured creditor is limited to
protection of the value of its lien.39
Those courts which have denied an undersecured creditor ade-
quate protection of opportunity costs have relied on the principle
that the property interest of the creditor is protected only from "a
decrease in the value of such entity's interest in the collateral due to
the imposition of the stay."
40
The basis for this position requires a reading of section 361 as a
whole. This context clearly contemplates protecting only the de-
crease in value and not other costs. 4 1 While section 361(3) seems to
37. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 1002.
38. Alyucan, 12 Bankr. at 805. The court in Alyucan stated:
Adequate protection is not defined in the Code. This omission was proba-
bly deliberate. Congress was aware of the turbulent rivalry of interests in
reorganization. It needed a concept which would mediate polarities. But a
carefully calibrated concept, subject to a brittle construction could not ac-
commodate the "infinite number of variations possible in dealings between
debtors and creditors." H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Session 339
(1977), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, p. 5787, 6295. This prob-
lem required, not a formula, but a calculus, open textured, pliant, and versa-
tile, adaptable to "new ideas" which are "continually being implemented in
this field" and to "varying circumstances and changing modes of financing."
Id. Adequate protection was requisitioned to meet these needs. Its mean-
ing, therefore, is born afresh out of the "reflective equilibrium" of each de-
cision, understood through analysis of the reorganization context and the
language of Section 362(d).
Id. at 805.
The court, in Alyucan, criticized the reliance of some courts on the proposition
that "secured creditors must receive the 'benefit of their bargain.' " Id. at n. 11.
Rather, it was argued that a more appropriate model would be to look at "the value
of the lien." Id. at 808.
39. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 989-90, 996.
40. Saypol, 31 Bankr. at 800 (court applies rule from section 361(1) and (2) to the
361(3) context by analogy); see also Penny, 52 Bankr. at 821 ("Adequate protection is
designed to protect the secured creditor's interest in collateral from deterioration.
Nothing more is required.").
41. See Saypol, 31 Bankr. at 799-800. The court in this case noted that, in section
361 (1) and (2), the language clearly indicates that a decline in value is "to be almost
decisive in determining the need for adequate protection." Id. at 800. The court
went on to say that: "[i]t is only with respect to § 361(3) that it can be said that
Congress may have intended an additional concept .... But this section is to be inter-
preted in light of and with the guidance of other provisions of the Code .... Id. (emphasis
added); see also South Village, 25 Bankr. at 997-99 (court analyzes various provisions of
Code which might be inconsistent with the concept of allowing opportunity cost).
[Vol. 13
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speak of an overriding requirement,42 these courts have indicated
that to read it broadly would be inconsistent with the rest of the
section.4
3
In support of this position, the South Village court looked to a par-
ticular reading of the legislative history.44 The court noted that the
substance of the legislative history emphasized the decrease in value
concept of adequate protection. 4 5 The court relied heavily on a re-
port which approved of this position.46 Further, the court noted that
when the differences of the House and Senate bills were resolved,
the leaders concluded that "[a]dequate protection of an interest of
an entity is intended to protect a creditor's allowed secured claim." 4 7
Through this, the court concluded that adequate protection was in-
tended to be protection against depreciation and not protection of
the value of the investment.48 Further, the court noted that the term
"value" should be equated with "allowed secured claim," thus elimi-
nating protection of opportunity costs. 4 9 The court concluded by
42. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432.
Sections 361(1) and (2) by their own terms compensate for "a decrease in
the value" of the secured creditor's interest. The compensatory nature of
adequate protection is even more apparent from the catch-all alternative of
section 361(3) authorizing "such other relief... as will result in the realiza-
tion by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in
such property."
Id. (emphasis added). Even the court, in South Village, acknowledged that "[s]ection
361 provides three nonexclusive illustrations of adequate protection." South Village, 25
Bankr. at 990 (emphasis added); accord Shriver, 33 Bankr. at 181. The court in South
Village, however, criticized the reliance on section 361(3) in allowing protection of
opportunity costs because its reading of Murel does not support the outcome. South
Village, 25 Bankr. at 990-91 n.4.
43. Saypol, 31 Bankr. at 800-02; see South Village, 25 Bankr. at 996. Judge Mabey's
analysis of the legislative history led him to conclude that Congress did not intend
section 361 to protect opportunity cost. Id.; see infra notes 45-51 and accompanying
text.
44. Compare South Village, 25 Bankr. at 992-96 (mortgage company was not enti-
tled to interest to compensate it for opportunity cost) with American Mariner, 734 F.2d
at 429-32 (under secured creditor stayed from repossessing its collateral was entitled
to compensation for delay under concept of "adequate protection"). The courts in
these cases cite very similar, and sometimes identical, passages of the legislative his-
tory, but come to opposite conclusions.
45. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 993.
46. Id. at 992, citing Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States, H. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. II, at 237 (1973). This court approved of a
Commission proposal that noted: "[a] benchmark in determining the adequacy of
protection is the liquidation value of the collateral at the date of the petition." Id. at
995 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 994 (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 995. The court noted that, given the elusive character of valuation, the
intent was to equate value with allowed secured claims. Id. This achieves the Con-
gressional goal of leaving the method of valuation open-ended. Id. Further, the
19871
9
Krikava: Lost Opportunity Cost to Undersecured Creditors: The Shifting San
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA TV REVIEW [l.
holding that Congress did not intend to require this protection.50
These courts bolster their readings of the legislative history by
noting that allowing the recovery of opportunity costs under this sec-
tion could create conflicts with other sections of the code.51 For ex-
ample, in South Village, Judge Mabey noted possible conflicts with
sections 502(b)(2), 506(b), 1124(2), and 1111(b).52 Section 50253
suspends the accrual of interest once a petition is filed. While sec-
tion 506(b)54 allows interest to accrue on certain oversecured debts,
it does not allow for the immediate payment of that interest.55 Judge
Mabey and others have noted that the theory of opportunity cost
contemplates not only the accrual, but also the payment of interest
on undersecured debts.56 This, they assert, creates a conflict with
court noted several problems that could arise under a contrary determination. Id. at
995-96.
50. Id. at 996. Several courts adopted the South Village approach on this issue
without extensive comment or analysis. See Keller, 45 Bankr. at 472 ("Judge Mabey
has provided extensive analysis" on this issue); Cantrup, 32 Bankr. at 1005 ("I think it
fair to say that [South Village] .. .dispelled any doubts as to" Congress' intent); Ameri-
can Mariner, 27 Bankr. at 1014 (court briefly notes South Village analysis and concludes
that legislative history does not require payment). The only other case which exten-
sively analyzes the issue and comes to the same conclusion is Timbers, 793 F.2d at
1384-1404.
51. See, e.g., South Village, 25 Bankr. at 997-99; see also Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1382,
1407-08 (Congress' codification of common law principles regarding "adequate pro-
tection" not intended to provide under secured creditors with periodic post-petition
interest payments on value of collateral).
52. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 997-99.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This section provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsections (e)(2),(f), (g), (h) and (i) of this sec-
tion, if such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice and a hear-
ing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the
United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such
claim in such amount except to the extent that-
(2) such claim is for unmatured interest.
Id.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). This section provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by the property the
value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is
greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder
of such claim, interest on such claims, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under the agreement under which the claim arose.
Id.
55. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 16, § 506.05. The applicable exception applies
where the creditor is over secured and where the contract permits interest. Id. See
generally O'Toole, Adequate Protection and Post-Petition Interest in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 56
AM. BANKR. L.J. 251 (1982).
56. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 997; see Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner
Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 10 Bankr. 711, 712-13 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1981), af'd on other grounds, 27 Bankr. 1004, rev'd, 734 F.2d 426; see Timbers, 793
F.2d at 1382 n. 1, 1385. Contra American Mariner, 27 Bankr. at 1009 ("We do not agree
with the court below that there is a negative implication to be derived from § 506(b)
Vol. 13
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol13/iss2/8
IN RE BRIGGS
the statute. 5 7 This apparent conflict has been expressly rejected by
some courts58 including some that deny protection for opportunity
costs. 5 9
Similarly, it has been said that section 11 1 (b)60 "seems opposed
to the idea of opportunity cost." 6 1 This section allows a creditor,
under certain circumstances, to treat a secured claim as if it has "re-
course against the debtor" even if the loan contract was a nonre-
course loan.6 2 It is argued that since opportunity cost theory is
premised on giving the creditor the benefit of the bargain, this sec-
tion weakens that argument. 63 Section 1 11 (b) condones a change
in the parties' bargain in opposition to the contract by allowing the
creditor added protection. 64 In light of this negative implication, it
is argued that the loss of the creditor's bargain in the adequate pro-
tection context is condoned.
6 5
which is applicable to § 361."). The court, in Briggs, also rejected this alleged con-
flict. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1347; see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
57. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 997. This position was also adopted by the court in
Pine Village, 19 Bankr. at 826-28. This court argued that since section 506(b) only
applies to over secured claims, "it follows that interest on all other prepetition claims
stops." Id. at 826.
The court concluded this analysis by stating:
Although it is true that an undersecured creditor does not recover interest
on his claim and thus would ultimately receive no compensation for the in-
terim period, this cannot be construed as unfair since 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)
makes no provision for interest to be added to the secured claim of the un-
dersecured claimant.
Id. at 828; accord Saypol, 31 Bankr. at 800. This result followed from the basic premise
of the opinion which was that "adequate protection is required solely to compensate
for a decrease in value of the collateral securing the claim." Id. at 827. This premise
was rejected by American Mariner and its progeny. See infra notes 82-86 and accompa-
nying text.
58. See American Mariner, 10 Bankr. at 712-13. Contra Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1382
n. 1 (" '[O]pportunity cost payments' are simply postpetition interest payments in
sheep's clothing .... ").
59. See American Mariner, 27 Bankr. at 1009; see also supra note 56 and accompany-
ing text.
60. Section 1111 (b) provides that: "A claim secured by a lien on property of the
estate shall be allowed or disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as if the
holder of such claim has recourse against the debtor on account of such claim,
whether or not such holder has such recourse . Id. § 111 l(b)(1)(A) (1982).
61. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 998-99.
62. 11 U.S.C. § llll(b)(l)(A); see South Village, 25 Bankr. at 999.
63. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 999. The court, in South Village, contended that:
[s]ection 1111 (b) seems opposed to the idea of opportunity cost. It is one
instance where debtors are deprived of the benefit of their bargain outside
bankruptcy. Lenders may escape the nonrecourse term of their agreement.
This shows less than complete fidelity to the "benefit of the contractual bargain" which is
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It is also argued that section 1 124(2),66 which permits the curing
of defaults, seems to fly in the face of opportunity cost theory.67
Since, under this section, the option exists to reinstate the contract,
payments as adequate protection might be inconsistent.68
A final rationale for the rule of these cases is that allowance of
opportunity costs will make it nearly impossible to effectuate a viable
reorganization.69 The argument is that reorganization is preferable
to outright liquidation.70 A rule which tends to thwart reorganiza-
tion is flawed and should not be followed.7t
66. Section 1124 provides that:
[e]xcept as provided in section 1 123(a)(4) of this title, a class of claims or
interest is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each claim or inter-
est of such class, the plan-
(1) leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to
which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest;
(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law that en-
titles the holder of such claim or interest to demand or receive accelerated
payment of such claim or interest after the occurrence of a default-
(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after the commence-
ment of the case ....
11 U.S.C. § 1124(1) & (2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
67. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 998. "Given this option to reinstate the contract on
its original terms when a plan is proposed, it may be anomalous to require the pay-
ment of interest at a market rate while the case is pending." Id. But see American Mari-
ner, 734 F.2d at 435 (court notes that regular payments are but one method of
achieving this protection).
68. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 998.
69. See Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1382. "[A] rule requiring periodic postpetition inter-
est payments to under secured creditors would often have a substantial adverse im-
pact on the orderly procedures for the distribution of a debtor's estate .... Id.; see
also Keller, 45 Bankr. at 473; supra note 32 and accompanying text.
This arguement was also raised by the debtor in Briggs. Brief for Appellant at 18-
19, Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1339. The debtor posited a hypothetical in support of this
position. It stated:
Imagine the farmer who has mortgaged his real estate to the Federal Land
Bank and to Farmers Home Administration, and his livestock, feed, current
crop, and machinery and equipment to the local bank. His interest pay-
ments have risen because of an increase in rates; the market price for his
livestock or crop has fallen. He has insufficient equity in his real estate and
personal property to borrow additional funds. If he makes the secured loan
payments, he will not have the necessary working capital to continue farm-
ing. He files a Chapter 11 petition to obtain the temporary relief necessary
to reorganize his operation. The payments to the fully secured creditor are
suspended by 11 U.S.C. Section 506. Whatever benefit is derived from the
suspension is eliminated under the opportunity cost concept, for the under-
secured creditor would be entitled by court order to a payment for the use
of its collateral during the pendance of the proceedings. The under secured
creditor is now receiving what the farmer could not pay before filing his
petition. What relief then is afforded the farmer in a Chapter 11 proceeding?
Id.
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Recently, the Fifth Circuit addressed the opportunity cost issue in
In re Timbers of Inwood Forest, Assocs. 72 The Timbers court analyzed the
recovery of the opportunity costs issue from a historical perspective
and noted that the prior law on this issue would not have provided
this protection. 73 After analyzing the legislative history of the cur-
rent Code, the court concluded that no change from prior law was
intended. 74 Throughout the court's analysis, an overriding concern
emerges that payments for opportunity costs are merely post-peti-
tion interest payments which would be disallowed after confirmation,
and not adequate protection of an intererst in property. 75 This, the
court held, was inappropriate in light of the prior law and the court's
reading of the statute.
76
This court's analysis is thoughtful and creative but, in light of
other portions of the legislative history and the clear language of the
statute, it should not be followed.
7 7
II. OPPORTUNITY COST As AN ELEMENT OF ADEQUATE PROTECTION
On the other end of the spectrum are the courts that have held
that opportunity costs to the undersecured creditor should be al-
lowed. 78 Chief among these courts is the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The court in In re American Mariner79 held, after lengthy
analysis, that the undersecured creditor was "entitled to compensa-
tion for the delay in enforcing its rights during the interim between
the petition and confirmation of the plan." 80
The court in American Mariner noted that the real issue in these
cases is not how to provide adequate protection but, rather, what
interests are required to be protected.8 ' While the bankruptcy
courts have wide latitude in deciding whether the interest has been
adequately protected, the statute must govern as to what interests
are to be so protected. Relying on general principles of statutory
construction, the court held that the plain meaning of section 361
provides for adequate protection of "an interest of an entity in property
... to the extent that the stay ... results in a decrease in the value of
72. 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986).
73. See id. at 1390-93.
74. Id. at 1401. "The provisions underwent substantial revision in the legislative
process, but the fundamental concept of the draft legislation that only depreciation
of collateral must be protected against was not explicitly criticized or rejected ..
Id.
75. Id. at 1382 n.1, 1407; see also supra note 58.
76. Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1382.
77. See infra notes 141-201 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 18.
79. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 435.
81. Id. at 430.
1987]
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such entity's interest in such property."8 2 Therefore, if opportunity cost
is an interest in property, it must be protected. 8 3
The court relied heavily on legislative history in determining that
the plain meaning of this provision should control.84 The court
noted that the proposed versions of section 361 by the Senate and
House differed in the scope of protection. 85 The court cited a pas-
sage from the House Report which indicated the breadth of adequate
protection.86 The ultimate adoption of the more expansive creditor
protecting version seemed to weigh heavily in the court's decision.8 7
82. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1982 & Supp. II 1984)(emphasis added by
court)).
83. See id. at 435. The court determined that opportunity costs are indeed an
interest entitled to protection. "Unquestionably, however, these are valuable rights
of secured creditors, and nothing in the reports suggests they are not among those
equitable and legal interests entitled to protection." Id. at 431. The court then re-
manded the case for a determination, based on the facts, on how best to provide this
protection. See id. at 435.
84. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430-32. The court acknowledged that there was
some conflict in the legislative history on this issue but that the clear indication was
that Congress has an overriding concern for protecting a "broad range of secured
creditors' interests." Id. at 430. Both the House and Senate Reports clearly express
the Congressional intention to provide protection for the secured creditor's interest
and not merely the value of the collateral. Id.
85. Id. at 430 n.4. The court pointed out that the original Senate version of the
Bill provided for restrictions on creditor's rights. See id. However, no such limitation
was found in the House bill. See id. When section 361 was enacted, the restrictive
language of the Senate version had been removed. See 11 U.S.C. § 361.
86. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431. The court stated that
[adequate protection] is not intended to be confined strictly to the constitu-
tional protection required, however. The section, and the concept of ade-
quate protection, is based as much on policy grounds as on constitutional
grounds. Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their
bargain. There may be situations in bankruptcy where giving a secured
creditor an absolute right to his bargain may be impossible or seriously det-
rimental to the bankruptcy laws. Thus, this section recognizes the availabil-
ity of alternative means of protecting a secured creditor's interest. Though
the creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose of the section
is to insure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he
bargained for.
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 595 at 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 6295). The court interpreted this passage to mean that the phrase "absolute
right to his bargain" was the equivalent of foreclosure and possession. Id. This was
not possible in this case since a determination had been made that the collateral was
necessary to effect a reorganization. Id. Nonetheless, Congress seems to have recog-
nized that the secured creditor's rights of repossession and sale are part of its "bar-
gain," which section 361 insures it will receive at least "in value" if not "in kind." Id.;
see United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 207 (1983) (court notes that
creditor's rights to adequate protection replace the protection provided by actual
possession).
87. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431. "[I]t seems clear that sections 361 and
362 include exceptional provisions specifically intended by Congress to benefit se-
cured creditors at the expense of the debtor." Id.
[Vol. 13
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While acknowledging the mandate for a case-by-case analysis,88
the court stated that it must protect the creditors when the "value"
of an interest is measurably threatened.89 Relying on a strict reading
of the indubitable equivalent language of the Code as evidencing a
strict approach to adequate protection,90 the court was convinced
that Congress intended the result found.91 In so doing, the court
expressly rejected the reasoning in South Village and its progeny on
the ground that those cases do not accord sufficient weight to the
language of the Code or to the protection of creditors' rights.92
The Ninth Circuit limited its holding by stating that the required
protection could take a variety of forms.93 It was not, the court held,
necessary for the debtor to make strict monthly "interest" payments
to the creditor. 94 This question was one of how to provide adequate
protection. It was proper subject matter for the bankruptcy court.9 5
Regardless of the form taken, however, the court held that some pro-
tection must be provided for the creditor's bargained-for rights.96
The rule enunciated in American Mariner has been applied by a
number of courts.9 7 The Fourth Circuit adopted this rationale in
Grundy National Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp.98 It has also been ex-
pressly rejected by some courts. 99
88. Id.
89. Id. at 432. Once it was determined that this interest was one that must be
protected, this conclusion followed as a matter of course.
90. Id. at 434. But see supra note 10 (Briggs court rejects restrictive approach to
this issue).
91. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 434. "Congress well understood the meaning
of the term in its original context and intended to adopt the strict approach that the
term represents." Id.
92. Id. at 434-35. "While we appreciate the care taken in this analysis, we con-
clude that South Village and Alyucan accord insufficient weight to the language of the
statute and the congressional goal of affording the secured creditor the benefit of its
bargain." Id.
93. Id. at 435.
94. Id.
95. See id. The court stated:
Consistent with the policies behind sections 361 and 362, the debtor should
be permitted maximum flexibility in structuring a proposal for adequate
protection. The result, however, should as nearly as possible under the cir-




97. See, e.g., Deeter, 53 Bankr. at 626-27 (adopts American Mariner analysis); Cash
Currency Exchange, Inc., 52 Bankr. at 580-81; see also supra note 18 (under secured cred-
itors are entitled to payment for lost reinvestment opportunity of collateral in addi-
tion to protection against depreciation).
98. 754 F.2d 1436, 1440-41 (4th Cir. 1985). Contra Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1416
("American Mariner is marked by logical inconsistencies .... ").
99. See, e.g., Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1416; see also Penny, 52 Bankr. at 821.
1987]
15
Krikava: Lost Opportunity Cost to Undersecured Creditors: The Shifting San
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
Several authors, following the American Mariner approach, relied
on a strict contract model analysis.iOO These authorities argue that
the creditor has bargained-for rights in the reinvestment value of the
collateral.' 0 ' As such, the creditor has a valid interest that is entitled
to be protected.102 The unifying principle in all of this seems to be
that the legislative history and the broad language of section 361,
and the policies in favor of protecting secured creditors require this
protection. 103
III. IN RE BRIGGS: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT POSITION
Falling somewhere between these two positions, the Eighth Circuit
held that providing opportunity costs to an undersecured creditor is
a question that must properly be decided on a case-by-case basis.104
The court rejected the rationale that protection of opportunity costs
must be provided as a matter of law and stated that this position
lacked the flexibility mandated under the Code.105
100. See Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Owner-
ship Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 97, 102 (1984); Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 874-75 (1982); Comment, Good Faith Inquiries
Under the Bankruptcy Code: Treating the Symptom, Not the Cause, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 795,
814-16 (1985); Comment, supra note 14, at 324-25; see also Molbert, Adequate Protection
for the Undersecured Creditor in a Chapter II Reorganization: Compensation for the Delay in
Enforcing Foreclosure Rights, 60 N.D.L. REV. 515, 529 (1984); Murphy, Use of Collateral in
Business Rehabilitations: A Suggested Redrafting of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 1506 (1975) ("If the stay of the marginally secured credi-
tor is properly viewed as an involuntary loan of property to the debtor, there seems
little reason not to afford the secured creditor some protection .... "). But see Nim-
mer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bargain Models of Fairness, 68 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1983) ("A major difficulty with [compensating for lost reinvestment
opportunities] is the paucity of support for it within the Code and its legislative
history.").
101. See Comment, supra note 14, at 307-09. It states:
The decision whether to provide interest on secured claims is of substantial
practical importance because it affects the cost and availability of secured
credit. Moreover, the current disarray in the case law makes creditors'
rights in bankruptcy uncertain, and this uncertainty increases the costs of
both secured and unsecured credit .... Compensation for the time value of
secured claims should always be included as part of the statutory "adequate
protection."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
102. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431.
103. See, e.g., id. at 431-32.
104. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1351. "[W]hat constitutes adequate protection in a partic-
ular case is a question whose resolution is best left to the knowledge and expertise of
the bankruptcy court." Id.
105. Id. at 1348-49 (adequate protection is a flexible concept that resists precise
definition and must be determined after balancing all relevant factors). The rejection
of the American Mariner per se rule seems anomalous in light of the heavy reliance
placed on American Mariner in three prior cases. See Martin, 761 F.2d at 476; Pruden-
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The creditors in Briggs were both undersecured.106 They were re-
ceiving monthly cash payments for the depreciation of the collateral
as a component of adequate protection.lO? They argued, however,
that those payments did not compensate them for the benefit of the
bargain as required under the American Mariner interpretation.108
The debtor argued that the creditors were only entitled to protection
from depreciation, which they were receiving, and not of their whole
bargain. 109
The court began its analysis by summarily dismissing the creditors'
constitutional challenges.110 The court noted that "[t]he automatic
stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections" provided by the
Code. l", The automatic stay, however, only delays the creditor's
right to enforce this lien."12 In addition, the creditor's property in-
terest is protected by the Code's provision for adequate protec-
tion.13 Thus, the temporary suspension rather than permanent
tial Ins. Co. v. Monnier (In re Monnier Bros.), 755 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (8th Cir.
1985). See generally Survey, Recent Developments in the Law of Bankruptcy: Analysis of Re-
cent Eighth Circuit Decisions, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 911, 939-45 (1986) (author
notes the interrelationship between Martin, Monnier and Briggs). The survey author
noted that "[i]n both Martin and Monnier, the court favorably cited [American Mariner]
... without expressly adopting or rejecting its analysis." Id. at 942-43.
In fact, the Eighth Circuit's reliance on American Mariner led at least one lower
court to conclude that the rule had been adopted in Martin. See Wolsky, 53 Bankr. at
755. The Wolsky court stated:
We have been reluctant to adopt American Mariner, and to consider compen-
sation for delay in repayment of an obligation as an interest which must be
adequately protected, because of the destructive effect which Amercan Mari-
ner's rationale would have on many agricultural reorganizations. However,
in view of Martin, we are constrained to adopt the rationale of American Mari-
ner in considering adequate protection.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Anderson, supra note 1, at 772.
106. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1341.
107. Id. The parties stipulated that the creditors would receive payments for the
depreciation of the assets as a component of adequate protection. Id.
108. Id. at 1342; see American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432-35.
109. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1342.
110. See id. The creditors argued that failure to protect their bargains would con-
stitute an impermissible taking in contravention of the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution. Id. This argument was rejected by the court which stated that "[t]he
bankruptcy code's automatic stay ... causes only a temporary delay of the creditor's
rights" and not an impermissible taking. Id. For a thorough analysis of this issue
which reached a similar conclusion, see Comment, supra note 1, at 440-52. The au-
thor of that Comment concluded that: "[B]ankruptcy courts are not constitutionally
required to lift the automatic stay: 'indubitable equivalence' in the sense of complete
compensation is not required to provide secured creditors with adequate protection
under section 362 of the Code." Id. at 451-52.
111. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1343 (quoting S. Rep. No. 989 at 54, reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5840 (1978)).
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deprivation of the creditor's right to enforce the lien, coupled with
the protection afforded creditors by the Code, satisfies any constitu-
tional requirements.' 14
The court went on to state that these principles mandate a flexible
approach toward determining what constitutes adequate protec-
tion.1 15 In its own review of the legislative history, the court con-
cluded that opportunity costs to the undersecured creditor are not
mandated by the statutory requirement of "indubitable equiva-
lence." 1 6 The court stated that adequate protection does not re-
quire that creditors be placed in the same economic position they
would have been in had no bankruptcy been filed.' 17 Thus, protec-
tion as a matter of law was unwarranted.'18
Similarly, the court rejected the notion that an undersecured cred-
itor's interest in opportunity costs may never be protected.119 The
court noted that this type of protection might sometimes be neces-
sary. 120 Again, its analysis stressed the equities of the particular case
as the primary consideration.12 It rejected the apparent conflict be-
tween the theory of opportunity costs and the mandate of sections
502 and 506 against such protection.122 The court stated "that ade-
quate protection is intended to encompass a broad range of credi-
tor's interests" and those interests can vary widely depending on the
facts of each case.' 23
Next, the court found that the various policies and interests in-
volved would be best served by adopting a case-by-case approach. 124
The court found this flexible approach mandated by the Code.125 It
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1348.
116. Id. at 1346. The court determined that this phrase was to be construed
broadly rather than narrowly. Id.
The Briggs court relied in part on the same portion of legislative history as the
American Mariner court. See id. The court interpreted this language differently by em-
phasizing that there may be situations where the secured creditor may not obtain the
absolute benefit of his bargain. See id. Unlike the court in American Mariner, the Briggs
court construed this passage as creating limitations on the rights of creditors to com-
pensation rather than a limit on the right of actual possession. Id.
117. Id. at 1346-47.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1349.
120. Id. One factor noted by the court which might bear on this issue is the likeli-
hood of success of the plan. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1347. "Section 506(b) simply provides an alternative to the adequate
protection provisions in sections 361 and 362 and does not serve as a limitation
thereon." Id.
123. Id. at 1345.
124. Id. at 1348.
125. Id. "Flexibility was legislated into the Bankruptcy Code by the very fact that
the term 'adequate protection' resists precise definition." Id.
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further found support in the language of some of the cases.' 26 It
even relied on certain sections of American Mariner that indicated flex-
ibility in analysis. 127
After announcing the general rule, the court stated a nonexclusive
list of factors to be used by the bankruptcy courts in determining
whether to grant opportunity costs. 128 These factors included the
"quality of the collateral or the length of the stay,"12 9 "whether the
collateral's lien value is demonstrated to be appreciating, depreciat-
ing or remaining relatively stable,"SO whether the debtor is taking
steps to keep the collateral free from statutory liens,t3t and whether
the chance of successful reorganization is great or slight.13 2 The
court claimed that these factors, when combined with the "infinite
number of variations possible in dealings between debtors and credi-
tors"t33 should provide courts with guidance in making reasoned
determinations. 134
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1348. The sections of American Mariner upon which the Briggs court
relied are taken out of context. According to the Briggs dissent, the American Mariner
court clearly spelled out that flexibility is applicable only after the creditor's interests
are defined. See id. at 1351 (Gibson, J. dissenting). "Nevertheless [American Mariner]
makes clear that the creditor is entitled as a matter of law to compensation for the
delay in enforcing its rights." Id.





133. See id. at 1345 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6295).
134. Id. at 1349-50; see Anderson, supra note 1, at 781-83 (the author of this article
applies the Briggs factors to the facts of the case, and comes to the conclusion that the
creditors should not be provided protection of their opportunity costs).
At least one bankruptcy court has adopted the Briggs position. See Peach State, 58
Bankr. at 876. In holding that the creditor was entitled to the opportunity cost pro-
tection under the facts of the case, the court relied on the Briggs factors. Id. at 875.
That court stated:
In a bankruptcy case with a high probability of success, it would be appropri-
ate to let the secured creditor await distribution in accordance with the go-
ing concern value of his property. When there is a lower probability of
success and correlatively higher probability that the value of the creditor's
collateral will be realized through liquidation, the Court should be more
inclined to include in adequate protection the opportunity costs incurred by
a secured creditor.
Id. (citation omitted).
Similarly, the court in Sheehan, 58 Bankr. at 303-04 followed the Briggs rule. The
Sheehan court used the Briggs factors to deny protection of the creditor's reinvestment
interests. Id. at 303. The court noted that the collateral was well-preserved and
maintained. Id. It also pointed out that all taxes were being paid and insurance was
being provided for the collateral. Id. Under those circumstances, the court stated
that additional protection was unwarranted. Id.
1987]
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The dissent countered by noting that, notwithstanding the need
for flexibility, the undersecured creditor should be protected for lost
opportunity costs as a matter of law.135 This very flexibility would
create confusion and uncertainty in future proceedings.136 The dis-
senting judge pointed out that, contrary to assertions made by the
majority, American Mariner only condones a case-by-case approach in
determining the method of providing adequate protection. 3 7 It
clearly required "compensation for the delay in enforcing" the credi-
tor's rights.138 The majority's reliance on the language of that case
was, therefore, misplaced. The dissenting judge believed that pro-
tection for lost opportunity cost would be the preferable course.13 9
IV. BRIGGS, THE MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE ISSUE
While the split of authority on this issue clearly allows room for
disagreement, the Briggs position fails because of its ultimate mis-
characterization of the issue.140 The Eighth Circuit's approach cre-
ates an untenable position for all parties.141 As a result of Briggs, the
bankruptcy court must now determine whether an interest exists, as
well as how to protect those interests that are found. 142 This ques-
tion of whether an interest exists should be answered by the Code,
which creates the substantive rights in bankruptcy.143 In light of the
135. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1351 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
136. See id.; see also Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1416. The Timbers court reached the oppo-
site conclusion from that urged by the dissentingjudge. Nevertheless, the court criti-
cized and rejected the uncertainty of the Briggs approach. Id.
137. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1351; see supra note 127.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1352.
140. Only by recharacterizing the issue could the court reach the result it did.
Had the court viewed this issue as a threshold statutory question, it would have had
to come to a definite conclusion one way or the other. See supra notes 78-104 and
accompanying text.
141. See Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1351 (Gibson, J., dissenting). "The weakness of the
court's position is that it sets free the bankruptcy court without any guidance whatso-
ever on the entitlement issue." Id.; see also Comment, supra note 14, at 308 (author
argues that an absolute rule would eliminate uncertainty).
142. See Comment, supra note 14, at 308-09.
143. The legislative history indicates a flexible case-by-case approach was contem-
plated only on how adequate protection should be provided, and not what adequate
protection is to be provided. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431. A pertinent sec-
tion of the House Report states:
The section does not specify how value is to be determined, nor does it
specify when it is to be determined. These matters are left to case-by-case
interpretation and development. It is expected that the courts will apply the
concept in light of the facts of each case and general equitable principles.
H.R. REP. No. 595 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6295, cited with approval in, American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431.
Nowhere does it state that this same approach should be used to determine what is to
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actual language of the statute,144 certain passages of the legislative
history,t45 and policy of protecting creditor's interests,146 the court
be protected. This aspect of adequate protection must come from the clear language
of the statute. See id. at 430.
144. See supra text accompanying note 82.
145. The conflict in the legislative history has been noted and criticized by courts
and commentators alike. See Amercan Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430; Comment, supra note
14, at 311 n.25 ("The legislative history does not specifically address whether ade-
quate protection must include time value compensation."); see also Fortgang & Mayer,
Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1074-76 (1985); Nimmer, supra note
102, at 10 (claims support for the position taken in American Mariner is paltry); Note,
Adequate Protection Becomes a Creditor's Took In re American Mariner, Industries, Inc., 21
WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 151, 158-65 (1984) (criticizes the American Mariner reading of
the legislative history).
Lack of a precise legislative history should not, however, work to nullify protec-
tion by implication in this instance. The courts are bound by the plain meaning of
the statute. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); see Badaracco v. Commissioner,
464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984) ("Courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because
they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement."); see also American Mariner,
734 F.2d at 430 (defines the plain meaning of the statute in the face of conflicting
legislative history). Even the Briggs court acknowledged that the legislative history
provides support for protection under some circumstances. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1348.
146. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 100, at 874-75. Ultimately, a rule that ensures
protection of opportunity costs would benefit debtors in the form of reduced cost of
secured credit. See Comment, supra note 14, at 307-08 n.15. That article states that:
Scholars generally assume that allowing secured creditors to contract
for the priority of security interests decreases the total cost of credit .... If
this assumption is correct, then a rule denying compensation for time value
during the stay can dilute the cost saving resulting from secured credit in
several ways. If secured creditors need to take extra collateral to increase
their chances of being fully secured in the event of bankruptcy, the debtor
will have less property available to secure additional loans, and fewer credi-
tors will be able to avail themselves of secured credit to reduce borrowing
costs. Similarly, if secured creditors add a premium to account for the risk
of not being able to foreclose on their collateral, the costs of credit will rise
overall, though it is likely that a reduction in the cost of unsecured credit
will partially offset the increased cost of secured credit.
One explanation of the cost-saving caused by secured credit follows
from a monitoring theory. The theory is that secured credit is cheaper than
unsecured credit because monitoring costs are lower; that is, unsecured
creditors must monitor all aspects of the debtor's operation to prevent mis-
behavior, but the secured creditor need only be sure that the debtor does
not dispose of the asset securing the loan .... One can easily see that a
secured creditor who was aware that he would not be completely compen-
sated for his secured claim would have to be more concerned with the possi-
bility of bankruptcy than a secured creditor who knew he would be fully
compensated. As a result, the creditor would have to pay closer attention to
the operation of the borrower's business as a whole, rather than merely to
the disposition of the collateral.
Id. at 308 n.15.
This argument, and economic force behind it, have been virtually ignored by the
courts in their discussions on this issue. But see infra note 181 and accompanying text.
Rather, the only economic factors that have been focused on have been those favor-




Krikava: Lost Opportunity Cost to Undersecured Creditors: The Shifting San
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
should have answered the question in the affirmative and followed
the rule enunciated in American Mariner.147 It is not for the courts to
rewrite the statute to fashion equitable results. The court must apply
the plain meaning of the statute. t 48
It should be recalled that the statute mandates that only those re-
organization plans that are "feasible" may be approved.149 The plan
can only be feasible when there is a reasonable likelihood of success
based on objective criteria and after taking into account all variables
and requirements, including the creditor protections found in the
Code.150 The requirement of protecting the interests of a secured
creditor is one such variable. If those interests cannot be adequately
protected, then, notwithstanding the policy of fostering reorganiza-
tions, the case is more proper for liquidation. 151 The American Mari-
ner rule goes a long way toward accommodating these interests by
assuring creditors protection of their valid interests.152
Much has been made of the practical difficulties attendent to the
American Mariner rule.t53 However, these practical problems are
147. In light of the legislative history cited by American Mariner and the adverse
economic impact of a contrary rule, this seems to be clearly defensible. But see Tim-
bers, 793 F.2d at 1413 (court takes issue with American Mariner analysis and cites con-
trary legislative history).
148. Compare American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430-32 with Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1384
(both courts cite this basis for their analysis and reach diametrically opposed conclu-
sions). The Briggs court never attempts to reconcile its analysis with this principle.
See Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1416.
The flexibility accorded to the bankruptcy court by Briggs is attractive to those
who fear that American Mariner's conclusions that under secured creditors are entitled
to postpetition interest payments as a matter of law will result in the wholesale, pre-
mature termination of Chapter 11 cases. Yet that very flexibility is difficult to reconcile with
the language "indubitable equivalent" and with the inflexible requirement of complete compensa-
tion of Murel and the cram-down provision on which American Mariner is based. Id. (em-
phasis added).
149. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co. (In re Clarkson), 767 F.2d 417,
420 (8th Cir. 1985). In order for a plan to be confirmed under 11 U.S.C. § 1129
(1982 & Supp. 11 1984) it must be feasible. Id. at 419-20. Feasibility is determined by
"predictions based on objective fact" and mere "sincerety, honesty, and willingness
are not sufficient to make the plan feasible." Id. at 420. See generally Survey, supra
note 105, at 947-48.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. I 1984). The statute states that a plan
may be confirmed only if it complies with all of the applicable provisions of the Code.
Id.; see Survey, supra note 105, at 947.
151. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
153. See Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1402-05. The court cites a litany of questions raised
by the American Mariner rule. These questions point out the difficutly in valuation and
computation. Id. at 1403. The court similarly noted the difficulty in setting the ap-
propriate amount of protection. Id. at 1404 (court characterizes this as rate of inter-
est).
This, however, mischaracterizes the real issue in the same way the Briggs court
did. The questions raised in Timbers go to the issue of how protection is to be deter-
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mere surplusage in light of the real issue.tS4 Starting, as one must,
with the actual language of the statute, this becomes clear.155 The
statute mandates protection of "an interest of an entity in prop-
erty." 15 6 This language is clear on its face; once an interest is found,
it must be protected.15 7 Consequently, arguments that address the
difficulty of administration go wide of the mark because they merely
indicate that protection of such an interest would be difficult to cal-
culate.158 They do not directly address the pure threshold question
of what interest is to be protected.t59 Similarly, the arguments that
the clause "to the extent that the stay . . .results in a decrease in
value of such entity's interest,"160 does not advance this argu-
ment.' 6 ' Again, valuation questions arise only after the interest has
been defined. 162
Since Congress did not expressly define an interest in property,163
mined. They do not address the underlying issue of what interests must be
protected.
154. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
155. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430; see also supra notes 82-84 and accompa-
nying text.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
157. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431.
158. The Briggs court stated that "bankruptcy courts should retain a high degree
of flexibility in arriving at adequate protection findings." Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1348.
Similarly, sections 361(1) and (2) provide that a creditor is entitled to protection
against depreciation. Id. at 1345.
159. For example, in South Village, the court cited a number of examples where
opportunity costs might be reduced, in support of its argument that this protection is
not required. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 1000-02; see also Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1401-08.
This argument, however, goes toward the determination of what protection is ade-
quate and not to what interest is to be protected. If, in fact, opportunity costs are
reduced through other mechanisms, this would show up in the final determination on
adequacy. The bankruptcy judge would take this into account when making that fac-
tual determination. These arguments do not, however, address the underlying,
threshold issue of entitlement.
The South Village and Timbers courts had a firm grasp on the real issue involved in
these cases. They merely used these extra arguments to bolster their conclusions.
Conversely, the Briggs court never came to grips with the threshold issue because of
the way it recharacterized it. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. By turning
the question of entitlement into a fact question, the Briggs court was able to circum-
vent the issue.
160. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
161. Reading the statute in its its ordinary sense, the clause "decrease in value"
must relate to the "interest in ... property" that is to be protected. Id.; cf. Watt, 451
U.S. at 266 (circumstances of enactment of particular legislation may persuade a
court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal
effect); see also supra note 153. Therefore, value determinations can only be made
after the interest is defined.
162. Cf South Village, 25 Bankr. at 993 (cites prior draft of this section in support
of argument that "value" is used to limit the types of interest to be protected).
163. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430. "Both the House and Senate reports
19871
23
Krikava: Lost Opportunity Cost to Undersecured Creditors: The Shifting San
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1987
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
it is appropriate to look at the language of the statute, the legislative
history, and surrounding circumstances for guidance.164 Congress
was aware of the problem secured creditors were having under the
old Act. 16 5 The 1978 reform took place partially in response to this
concern. 16 6 This issue was raised prior to the enactment of the
Code' 6 7 so the result reached did not occur in a vacuum.168 While
the legislative history of section 361 is mixed, it can be assumed that
Congress knew the meaning of the words it actually used. 169 It in-
tentionally chose to use the phrase "indubitable equivalent" know-
ing the historical context in which this phrase came into being.170
Although earlier draft legislation indicated that no protection in this
context must be provided, this by itself does not mitigate against the
language actually used.171
clearly express the congressional intention to provide protection for the secured
creditor's interest and not merely the value of the collateral . ... " Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, one commentator stated: "both the House and Senate reports indicate a
concern for protecting the tangible value of the collateral from a decline due to phys-
ical depreciation. Congress' concern for physical depreciation would not, however,
preclude a desire to protect other aspects of a secured creditor's interest in collat-
eral." Molbert, supra note 100, at 520.
164. See Watt, 451 U.S. at 265-66.
165. See 123 CONG. REC. H 11698 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977) (comments by Rep.
Edwards). One of the underlying reasons for the bankruptcy reform was "that credi-
tors were not getting enough out of bankruptcy proceedings .... Id.; see also Mas-
sari, supra note 5, at 171 (notes that the Act allowed debtors to encumber collateral
during proceedings while the Code is much more concerned with creditor's rights).
166. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431. The court states in American Mariner: "[I]t
seems clear that sections 361 and 362 include exceptional provisions specifically in-
tended by Congress to benefit secured creditors at the expense of the debtor." Id.
167. See generally Murphy, supra note 100, at 1506. Murphy advocated this position
during the hearings and revisions of the Code. Id.
168. See generally Baird & Jackson, supra note 100, at 97 (noting uncertainties in-
volved in bankruptcy law).
169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
It is significant that the phrase "indubitable equivalent" was not used in the
prior drafts of the Code. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432; see also Molbert, supra
note 100, at 521. Clearly, Congress knew the historical meaning of the phrase when
it was adopted. See supra note 10.
The court in Timbers argued that reliance on this statutory phrase begs the ques-
tion because "indubitable equivalence" does not define the interest, it merely refers
to a substitute for a particular interest. Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1389. However, when
Congress chose to use the phrase, it was not incorporating the context but rather the
concept of indubitable equivalence. The concept, as used in the statute, suggests a
completely compensatory standard. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 433; accord
Molbert, supra note 100, at 522.
171. Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1393. The Commission proposal was much more restric-
tive than the language actually used. The comments to the proposed legislation
stated, in part: "A benchmark in determining the adequacy of protection is the liqui-
dation value of the collateral at the date of the petition. Id. The courts denying
adequate protection of opportunity costs rely heavily on the Commission's language.
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Foreclosure and reinvestment of the collateral can only be seen as
a creditor's interest in property. 172 If a creditor holds a lien, there is
a clear detriment in the form of lost opportunity to foreclose the lien
and to reinvest the proceeds.t73 When the lien is oversecured, the
detriment to the creditor is no problem because there are avenues
protecting this interest.174 However, where, as in the present situa-
tion, the debt is undersecured, the detriment to the creditor is the
same. 17 5 Only the American Mariner approach assures this creditor
protection, in lieu of his rights, to foreclose and reinvest the collat-
eral. 176 Any contrary rule runs the risk of punishing secured credi-
tors who, for whatever reason, hold an undersecured lien.' 77 Since
the statute plainly states that an interest, once found, must be pro-
tected, that language cannot be disregarded absent clear indications
to the contrary. 178 While the ultimate benefit to the creditor may be
unattainable, 179 the language of the statute indicates a right to a quid
See, e.g., Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1393; South Village, 25 Bankr. at 992; see also Nimmer,
supra note 100, at 8. This reliance, however, does not adequately take into account
the change in the language used and the history behind that language. See American
Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432; accord Molbert, supra note 100, at 522 ("By using the indubi-
table equivalent language in secion 361, it seems apparent Congress certainly envi-
sioned compensation for delay in exercising foreclosure rights as a part of adequate
protection.").
172. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431; see Comment, supra note 14, at 307-09; see
also Molbert, supra note 102, at 517. The right to repossess the collateral and use the
proceeds of the collateral sale is the essence of secured lending. Indeed, the exist-
ence of collateral is the only basic difference between a secured creditor and an un-
secured creditor. The right to repossess and sell the collateral also has very real
economic value to the secured creditor. First, it provides a method of repaying the
indebtedness. Second, it assures, to the extent of the value of the collateral, an al-
most immediate repayment of the indebtedness and the ability to reinvest the repay-
ment in the marketplace. Id.
173. For a helpful general discussion in this issue see Jackson, supra note 100, at
874-75. Using a contractual model as a guide, that article concludes that protection
against such a detriment should be provided. Id. (notes that the indubitable
equivalent standard is often ignored).
174. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
175. Where the collateral is necessary to effect the reorganization, the creditor
cannot reach it, whether he is over secured or under secured. Id. § 362(d)(2)(B).
176. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431.
177. See Comment, supra note 14, at 319. The courts that rely on reorganization
policy in denying time value compensation also fail to recognize that denying com-
pensation for time value during the stay conflicts with the policy of the absolute pri-
ority rule, which underlies the reorganization provisons of the Code. The absolute
priority rule entitles senior claimants to full payment before junior claimants receive
anything. Id. By denying compensation to under secured creditors for opportunity
costs, the courts are relegating that portion of the debt that is under secured to un-
secured status, without any justification from the Code. See id. at 320.
178. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430-32.
179. See supra note 86.
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pro quo in value, if not in kind.180
Beyond the statute, however, economic realities indicate that this
is the proper result.181 A debtor bias, as implicitly evidenced in
some of the cases,18 2 will not only unfairly hurt creditors but will
ultimately hurt debtors in the form of higher credit cost.1 8 3 Con-
gress was at least aware of these issues when it enacted the Code. 184
Had Congress wished to ignore these creditors' rights, it could
have.18 5 But the fact remains that it did not. 186 Surely, the evolu-
tionary draft changes in the language of section 361 were something
more than grammatical fine tuning.18 7 The change can be inter-
preted as a change in philosophy in light of the competing pressures
involved. 188
In sum, the language of the statute indicates the result found in
American Mariner.189 While the legislative history is contradictory on
this issue, there is strong support for the position.190 Conversely,
the split of authority and the contrary legislative history graphically
demonstrate that there is support for the opposite position.191
180. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431 (the bankruptcy court found that the
collateral in question was necessary to an effective reorganization which meant that
the creditor was not entitled to an "absolute right to his bargain").
181. See supra note 150, and accompanying text. But see Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1384
(court rejects proposition that economic realities can be used to construe the
statute).
182. See Jackson, supra note 100, at 857. Jackson states that: "[T]his discharge-
centered view of bankruptcy is correct neither from an historical perspective nor
from a realistic appraisal of the present and operation of most of the provisions in the
federal bankurptcy laws over the years." Id.; see also Comment, supra note 14, at 318
("[C]ongress did not revere reorganizations as an end to be achieved at the expense
of secured creditors.").
An excellent example of the pro-debtor type of bias can be found in Keller, 45
Bankr. at 472-73, where the court's only apparent concern was the impact on the
debtor. Cf Chugiak, 18 Bankr. at 298 (reorganizations should be fostered only in
those cases where liquidation is avoidable).
183. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 14, at 307-10.
184. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also Molbert, supra note 100, at
527 ("no court has held that the Constitution requires such compensation.").
186. No court or commentator has argued that the language of the statute is clear
on its face in support of the contrary proposition. Instead, all of these authorities
have relied on a contrary reading of the legislative history and the practical problems
surrounding the American Mariner rule. See, e.g., Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1380-1416.
187. See, e.g., American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432 (court concludes that the change in
language in statute evidenced an intent to change the meaning of the statute).
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 78-104 and accompanying text.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Timbers, 793 F.2d at 1393-1404. If one can place reliance on the
language of the prior drafts, there is clear support for this position. But see supra
notes 175-90 and accompanying text.
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There is little support, however, for the Briggs position when the is-
sue is viewed clearly.19 2 Once the extraneous matter of valuation
and adequacy of the protection are stripped away, ' 93 the Briggs case
fails.19 4 The statute must govern whether a creditor has an interest
in its reinvestment potential or not. It is not a question that should
vary from case to case. 19 5 Indeed, the statute does not allow it. 196
Once that threshold statutory question is resolved, the bankruptcy
court will use its equitable powers to fashion an appropriate remedy
under the facts of the case.' 9 7 Briggs lost this distinction in its analy-
sis and found a rule that is no rule at all.' 98 It is merely the shifting
sands of uncertainty in the guise of equity.
CONCLUSION
In Briggs, the Eighth Circuit embarked on a treacherous course in
which neither debtors, creditors, or judges have sufficient guidance.
The effect will be to create confusion in an area of the law begging
for a uniform and predictable rule. 199 Application of the Briggs fac-
tors can easily lead to inconsistent and anomalous results, which will
ultimately have an impact on the entire bankruptcy system.
20 0
Moreover, the Briggs decision does not accord sufficient weight to
the language of section 361(3) which requires that a creditor's inter-
est in property shall be protected. If, as the court seems to admit,
reinvestment rights or opportunity costs are an interest in prop-
erty,2 01 then that interest must be adequately protected. While the
problem of encouraging effective reorganizations is a real one, to do
so at the expense of creditors is wrong and contrary to the language
of the Code and policy. If the result indicated under the present
language of the Code is not what was intended, then it is for Con-
gress to change the law.
Michael C. Krikava
192. See supra notes 119, 144-47 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
194. See id.
195. See infra note 201.
196. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431.
197. Id. at 435.
198. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
199. See Comment, supra note 14, at 308. The author of that work stated that an
absolute rule, whether favoring or opposing protection of opportunity costs, would
eliminate uncertainty in credit transaction and help stabilize the costs of credit. Id.
200. See Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1351 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
201. Nowhere in the opinion does the court expressly acknowledge this. How-
ever, the court does say that there are circumstances where the creditor should be
protected. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1349. What is being protected in these circumstances?
An interest in property is the only logical conclusion.
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